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Abstract 
The purpose is to compare the perfect Stochastic Return (SR) model like Islamic banks to the 
Fixed Return (FR) model as in conventional banks by measuring up their impacts at the 
macroeconomic level. We prove that if the optimal choice of share’s investor in SR model α* 
realize the indifference of the financial institution toward SR and FR models, there exists α<α* 
such that the banks strictly prefers the SR model. Also, there exists α,  and λ verifying the 
conditions of α-sharing such that each party in economy can be better under the SR model and 
the economic welfare could be improved in a Pareto-efficient way.  
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to compare the stochastic return model i.e. applied by Islamic banks 
to the fixed return model i.e. followed by traditional banks. The comparison will be done by 
measuring up the impacts of each model at the macroeconomic level. The commercial financing 
model stipulates a fixed payoff as the retribution of financial capital use even if this latter does 
not generate a profit for the investor. In contrast, the Islamic financial contract must specify only 
the sharing of the return from the project between the investor and the financier.  
The basic hypotheses are specified in order to prove which one of two models is more 
efficient and could improve social welfare (Khan, 1989). There are two forms of finance are 
available to investors in different economic activities, Stochastic Return Model (SR) and Fixed 
Return Model (FR). The Stochastic Return is based directly on the investment profitability, while 
Fixed Return is independent of the investment outcome. Nevertheless, historically the interest 
rate charged by banks has been considerably lower than the unobservable profit rate. Several 
reasons may be adduced in support of each hypothesis.  
The hypotheses are related to: firstly supply and demand of financial funds in the financial 
market, secondly sharing information system and finally the attitudes to risks mainly for the 
macro-investor (Siddiqi, 2004). The monetary base, generated initially by a central bank, 
constitutes the supply of available financial funds in the economy which can be either used as 
credit or as corporation to productive sectors. The decisions depend upon the disposable 
contracts in the financial market. Two principal agents are concerned directly to make such 
decisions, banks or financial institutions as manager of finance flows, and the investors as 
manager of real flows.  
The paper is organized as following, in the second section the economic-financial hypothesis 
and technical are presented. The third section displays the risk aversion under SR and FR 
models. The fourth section exhibits the determination of a best choice, and the fifth section 
reveals the Pareto-efficiency. The last section concludes by the main findings.  
2. Hypotheses 
2.1 Economic and Financial Hypothesis 
In fact, the aggregate saving is deduced from saving decisions which are based strictly on the 
level of income. So theoretically the aggregate saving of households does not depend on the 
interest rate even if they have deposits in banks. These financial resources are mobilized costly 
by banks in their credit system. At this stage, it is easy to argue that the saving decision and the 
investing decision are two distinct operations. A higher remuneration should be attached to the 
active one (Balestra & Baranzini 1971).   
In light of the previous definitions and principles it is possible to spell out the following 
hypotheses required for the comparison of SR’s model to FR’s model. The Financial market is 
unambiguous (H1), this assumption explains that in regular economic conditions, the investment 
projects are not correlated. When the business cycle is in the downswing, i.e. during a recession 
banks expect profit to decline, the losses would spread throughout the credit market. In this 
context, the FR’s model leads to a series of bankruptcies of banks, whereas the SR’s model 
constitutes an advantage because the two contractual parties would strive conjointly to minimize 
lose and could reorient in other way the investment project.      
The hypothesis of Separation (H2) requires that the performance of project is no correlated 
to financing decision. Formally the production function is independent of whether the funds are 
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from debt (FR) or equity in the common sense (SR)1. At least this absence of correlation 
between technical production and financial mode of activities of firm could be justify since the 
marginal productivity of capital, ceteris-paribus, should be independent of whether the new 
investment is raised via debt or equity. The efforts of investor are identical across different 
financial contracts. This assumption avoids the latent problem of moral hazard.  
The drawback of this hypothesis is that it rules out incentive effects associated with the 
ownership structure of the firm. This is true essentially for FR’s model, because the SR’s model 
implies joint ownership. Furthermore, considering the investor, the major reason for its 
preference of debt is the existence of a moral hazard problem in the credit market. The hypothesis 
of Risk aversion (H3) indicates that the investors are not free of risk aversion. For the SRs 
model, this hypothesis is realistic and could be explained by the widespread use of equity in the 
firm’s capital structure. While the existence of credit market and stock market reveals the 
aspiration of firms to build up various contracts forms for shifting risk to creditors. In fact, the 
choice of contract form depends more on the attitude of the investors towards risk.  
The hypothesis of Identical return likelihood (H4) 2 suggests that the investors and banks 
have identical and costless information. This hypothesis is reliable to the rational expectations on 
each side either investor-producer or investor-bank. It supposes also weak differential of 
information structure. The alternative hypothesis could show that debt will be preferred even if 
the investor seems to be more risk averse and he can’t reach the upper tail of the return 
likelihood. In fact the investor can costlessly observe the performance of his project. He can 
provoke asymmetrical information in the credit market. Especially since the debt requires 
minimal information of the project. Thus, the availability of costless and minimal information 
could generate the problem of moral hazard.  
The SRs model does not have any collateral requirement. But banks in order to avoid this 
problem require collateral. In this way the FRs model ejects potential investors. As such the SRs 
model overcomes this problem and there may be a lot more investors in the economy with more 
risky investment but higher expected return.  
 
2.2 Technical Hypotheses 
The first one is related to the Funds and returns of investment (H5). Considering L  as the 
total supply of investment funds: 
21 ZZL   ;  L Z 1   &  LZ )1(2    with    10    
where iZ  is the amount of funds financing investment projects according to the i  model; 1i  
corresponds to SR model and 2i  represents the FR model.  
Let ii RZ  be the amount of profits made by investors in i  model where iR  is the rate of 
return on investment, it is considered a stochastic variable and having real and positive values:        
 2RR ,i.i.d. ~ iR      10  iR  
where  iR RE  and  iR RVi 
2 .  This distribution implies that: 
                                                           
1 Here the concept of equity does not mean the sharing system of exchange stock. It is based on the direct 
participation in the production corporate i.e. sharing system of production with optimal distribution of risk.   
2
 Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) showed that with imperfect information, the firms can be credit rationing. They argue that 
asymmetry of information between banks and borrowers, leads to the problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Given lack of information available to banks concerning the true risk level of each loan, they charge interest 
rates according to the average expected level of risk.  
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   iiii REZRZE   and    iiii RVZRZV
2  
Formally, the FR model is the dominant financial system based on loans. It consists to allow a 
quantity of money (principal) to the investor on the condition that the principal plus a fixed 
interest (as a fixed percent return on principal) is payable on a fixed future time by a fixed 
amount of money noted  DZ 12  where D  is the interest rate charged by bank. If the earnings 
fall below this fixed amount, then a lesser amount will be paid: 
if DDR   receive  lllender  wi  the:2   
                if 22   entire    thereceive  lllender  wi  the: RDR   
In contrast, formally the SR model is a financial system based on profit sharing. In this model 
the financier would receive a share of the project’s return. In case of loss, no party gets anything. 
The second one concerns the Aggregate payoffs of financier and investor (H6). It is supposed 
that no collateral is required from investors in two models. In the FR model, the financial 
contract stipulates:  
   ,min 222 DRZP                 0 ,max 222 DRZY             10  D  
where 2P  is a semi-stochastic variable and 2Y  is a stochastic variable, they represent the 
aggregate payoffs for banks (lenders) and for investors (borrowers) respectively.  
Whereas, in the SR model, the financial contract stipulates: 
   1 111 RZP                111 RZY              10   
where 1P  and 1Y  are stochastic aggregate payoffs for financiers (with a share 1 ) and 
investors respectively. After these specifications, the problem is to determine the best or 
preferred contract in the financial market i.e. the Pareto-Optimal contract3.  
 
3. Expectation and Risk Aversion 
3.1 Expectation of Payoffs 
How we can determine the financier’s attitude toward the financial model as the total supply of 
funds L  is allocated to projects according to SR and FR models? We should calculate the 
expected payoff under these models. In the FR model, the expected payoff for the financier is 
giving by: 
            DRELDREZDRZEPE ,min 1,min,min 222222   
            DRVLZDRVZDRZVP ,min 1,min,minV 222
2
2222   
In the SR model, it is given by: 
            111111  111 RELREZRZEPE    
            11
2
1
2
1
2
111  Z111 RVLRVZRZVPV    
Since the financier is supposed to be risk averse (H3) like investor, it is important to examine 
his expected utility (assumed to be continuous) in order to identify his preference for any model. 
Also the bargaining financial process is assumed continuous. The financier will be indifferent 
between SR and FR models if he will receive the same expected payoff. 
 
 
  
                                                           
3 The allocation of resources in an economy is Pareto-optimal (efficient), if it is not possible to change the allocation 
of resources in such a way as to make some one better off without making others worse off.     
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3.2 Risk Aversion under SR and FR Models 
We have two ways to determine the best contract. It is possible for the investor to find D  and 
  so that: ,D  exist such that    21 YEYE  . It remains that at this point, the choice of the 
contract depends on the preference of the financier.  
Also, it is possible to assume that the financier assumed is risk neutral to find D  and   so 
that: ,D  exist such that    21 PEPE  . At this point, the choice of the contract depends on 
the preference of the investor. We choose this approach by assuming that the financier is risk 
averse. Because the investor represents the demand side and he can choose the appropriate 
source of funds, either from SR or FR, to financing his productive investment’s efforts. 
Proposition 3.1: Let a fixed D , 10   and 
2
1
 : then it exists *  such that 
   12 PEPE  . And for 
*  : then    12 PEPE  . (See Proof in Annex) 
This result indicates that the bank may become indifference between the two models. In 
contrast, if a greater portion of investment funds are allocated to the FR model, the previous 
result shows that the financier prefers strictly the FR model. So the expected payoff in FR model 
is great than in SR model for all  . The choice of model is based on its expected payoff, the 
bank strictly prefers the SR model which gives a higher expected payoff.  
At this stage, the choice of the contract depends on the attitude of investor toward risk. If the 
investor is risk neutral, the result can be apprehended via a specific version of Miller-Modigliani 
(MM) theorem (Miller & Modigliani 1961; Stiglitz 1969; Miller 1988). The celebrated MM 
theorem asserts that the value of the firm, in a given risk class, is independent of its capital 
structure i.e. irrelevance of the choice of financial model. This theorem does not suppose the risk 
aversion, and then it can’t capture this attitude of an investor.  
 
4. Determination of a Best Choice 
Hypothesis 3 of risk aversion raises some difficulties in reaching the solution to the best choice. 
In order to precisely find the solution, the expected utility of the payoff will be important, mainly 
the point where this utility is identical under the two models.  
Firstly, a risk averter i.e. investor would prefer a less risky income flow among flows having 
the same expected payoff. Then it remains important to determine the riskiness associated to 
payoffs in the two models. From FR model and SR model, we have respectively: 
 0,222 DRmax ZY   and   11111 RZR ZY    
and at * , it exists    21
* : YEYED    
Consider U  the aggregate utility function of the investors. U  is supposed bounded and 
0U ''  (i.e. risk aversion). Since the expected payoff of the investors is identical in SR and FR 
models if      21 YUEYUE  . Under the risk aversion, the SR model will be preferred so that: 
     21 YUEYUE   
because the investor in FR model is more inclined to risk and his expected payoff would be less.  
This result must be proved and can be expressed in the following proposition. To capture the 
proprieties of R , it is important to define the sharing  rule and the Mean Preserving Spread 
(MPS) in the next definitions (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1970 and 1971):  
Definition of sharing :  
An sharing  rule is a real function  RS  such that (Merton, 1992; Levy 2006): 
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(i)   10  RRS  
(ii)       RSRERSE    where   is the sharing rate for investors. 
(iii)   
k
k RS 1 where k  stands for shareholder in risk investment.  
Definition of MPS:  
A Mean-Preserving Spread of sharing  is defined as follows: 
    212 ZRSRS YY   
where  2RSY  is a mean-preserving spread of  1RSY  and 2Z  is a random variable that is 
statistically independent of  1RSY  such that   0 iZiZE   and   0
2 
iZi
ZV  .4 The 
stochastic variable Y  stands for the aggregate payoffs for investors. The theoretical mean will be 
defined as: 
          1212 RSEZERSERSE YYY    
and the preserving spread is defined as follows:  
      222212 121 RZRYY ZRSVRSV    
Intuitively, it is easy to expect that the risk averse associated with  1RS  implies the 
preference of  1RSY  to  2RSY . Indeed, the risk aversion shows that  2RSY  is more riskier 
than  1RSY .   
Proposition 4.1: Consider    0,max 22 YY DRRS   and    YP DRRS ,min 22   where YS  and 
PS  verify the conditions (i) to (iii). Then, for any concave and bounded utility function U and 
any sharing  rule  RS  particularly  1RSY , we have  
           212 RSUERSUERSUE YYP  . (See Proof in Annex) 
We can prove separately the double inequality straightforwardly by using a MPS of 
sharing  and the Taylor expansion at degree two. This result exhibits that any risk aversion 
agent would prefer the sharing  of   2RSP  to sharing  of  1RSY . In consequence, 
 2RSP  is preferred to  1RSY  which is preferred to  2RSY . The proposition also exhibits by 
transitivity that the sharing -investor of  1RSY  would be preferred to the sharing  of 
 2RSY . This result shows that in terms of sharing  and of expected payoff the SR model 
seems to be better than the FR model.  
5. Pareto Efficiency 
This central concept is widely accepted standard for comparing economic outcomes. There are 
many efficient situations in which the active agent tends to avoid the inefficiency. Our 
proposition identifies inefficiency situations and it is important to designing policies and 
institutions that will promote efficiency and reduce inefficiency.  
The financier in FR model in order to avoid many problems like moral hazard, adverse 
selection, bankruptcy could reduce Pareto-efficiently his weak risk aversion by improving the 
outcomes of investors in economy through the reallocation of payoffs. It is optimal that the 
                                                           
4
 This strong hypothesis can be replaced by the uncorrelated random variables. And any function of  iY RS  is 
uncorrelated of any function of iZ . 
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financier immunes all investors (in macroeconomic view) and adopts the SR model. This must 
increase the correlation between the ownership and capital structure such that we have next 
Pareto-Optimal payoffs:  
           212
~~~
RSUERSUERSUE YYP   
 
Proposition 5.1: Each party (investors and financiers) can be better in SR model and the 
economic welfare could be improved in a Pareto efficiency way. (See Proof in Annex) 
 
6. Conclusion 
The SR model seems to be Pareto-Optimal Contract and proves the inferiority of the FR 
contract i.e. debt model. But the credit market dominates throughout the world. Furthermore, 
the Pareto-optimal solution could improve the payoff of financier in the FR model if the payoff 
of SR model has been increased and the additional outcomes would be distributed in half with 
the other investors operating in FR model.  
These arrangements permit that these moves are likely to be Pareto-Optimal. The SR model 
has the spreading risk more evenly than the FR model, and considering the risk aversion of the 
investors, then the SR model dominates the FR model and the higher outcomes should be 
associated with the active one i.e. the SR investor. In addition, the SR model has far-reaching 
impacts for the stability of a financial system. So this result is very opportune for the financial 
policy purposes. The real macroeconomic investment might be higher in the SR model than in 
the FR model at least because it doesn’t require imperative collateral and it could reward the 
more riskier agent.  
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Annex 
Proof proposition 3.1: Consider a continuous function  h :      12 PEPEh   
          12 1,min1 RLEDRLEh    
         12 ,min10 REDRELh         and           0,min11 2  DRELh             
If         0D,Rmin
2
1
0:
2
1
12  REELh , (by using intermediate value theorem). If 
  00:
2
1
 h , but if   00:
2
1
 h . As h  is continuous and 
2
1
 , it exists *  : 
     10 * hhh    and   0* h . For *0   :      210 PEPEh    
 
Proof proposition 4.1: Letting  1RSY  the random sharing  rate, and U  the utility function of 
 RS  which is assumed with risk averse i.e.    0'' RSU . The expected utility of  RS  is 
   RSUE .  
       
     
         221
''
21
'
1
212
2
1
                ZRSUZRSURSU
ZRSURSU
YYY
YY


 
then the expected value gives:   
  
               
            0     ,  
2
1
                    
2
1
2
21
''
1
2
21
''
21
'
12


iYY
YYYY
ZEZERSUERSUE
ZRSUEZRSUERSUERSUE
 
            0 and 0     ,   21''21 2  ZYYY σRSUERSUERSUE     
In the same way, the second inequality shows that  1RSY  is more riskier than  2RSP . By using a 
MPS there exists 1Z  is a random variable such that     121 ZRSRS PY   which  2RSP  is a random 
sharing  rate. The expected utility gives:  
 
               
            0     ,  
2
1
                    
2
1
2
12
''
2
2
12
''
12
'
21


iPP
PPPY
ZEZERSUERSUE
ZRSUEZRSUERSUERSUE
 
            0 and 0     ,   22''12 1  ZPYP σRSUERSUERSUE .   ■ 
 
Proof proposition 5.1: From the proposition 1, for all        21*  and 0:,0 PEPEh    i.e. the 
financier would prefer SR model. U  is continuous and concave (i.e. risk aversion):  
it exists       such that  11:,0;1,1 ***    
       12 RSUERSUE PP        12 1,min RUEDRUE P    
This solution is Pareto-optimal. But it is possible to find another solution which can improve the 
payoff of the banks in FR model, and the lenders strictly prefer the SR model: it exists
 
    *
2
*
2
11,0,     that  such   
 8 
       121221 1,1min RUEDRUE P    
Also, it exists       such  that :,0, **    
       12 RSUERSUE YY         12 0,max RUEDRUE Y    
It is possible to improve in Pareto-Optimal way the payoffs of investors in FR without changing the 
investor preference for the SR model, and the borrowers strictly prefer the SR model: it exists
    *
2
*
2
such that  ,0,     
       121221 0,1max RUEDRUE Y   .  ■ 
